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1.   Introduction 
 
In recent years, the macro-economic effects of fiscal shocks have been extensively 
analysed in the empirical literature (Hemming et al., 2002). Some studies have applied 
Vector AutoRegression (VAR) methods previously used to analyse the effects of 
unanticipated monetary impulses. Fiscal shocks have usually been modelled by imposing 
sign restrictions on the impulse responses (Mountford and Uhlig, 2005), by relying on a 
Choleski ordering with the fiscal variable appearing first (Favero, 2002), or by exploiting 
decision lags in fiscal policy and institutional information about the elasticity of fiscal 
variables to economic activity within a structural VAR framework (Blanchard and 
Perotti, 2002). Based on the ‘narrative approach’ of Romer and Romer (1989), another 
strand of literature has pursued an alternative route where specific exogenous fiscal 
episodes are isolated through dummies (Burnside et al. 2004, and Christiano, et al. 1999, 
among others). 
Despite this growing empirical literature, there is still no consensus on the size or 
even the sign of the effects of fiscal shocks on output or the real exchange rate. A 
possible explanation are the difficulties involved in their identification. As pointed out in 
Mountford and Uhlig (2005), standard problems encountered in the application of the 
VAR methodology to assess the effects of fiscal shocks are the following: i) how to 
distinguish movements in fiscal variables which are caused by fiscal policy shocks from 
those in response to other shocks; ii) how properly to define fiscal shocks; iii) the 
existence of a temporal lag between the announcement and the implementation of fiscal 
policy. The narrative approach makes it possible to circumvent potentially controversial 
identifying assumptions (typical of the VAR approach), but it has the drawbacks that 
these episodes could be in part anticipated or that substantial fiscal shocks, of different 
type or sign, could have occurred around the same time (Perotti, 2002). 
In general, all these studies have mainly focused on developed countries and within a 
closed-economy setup, while the literature on the international transmission of fiscal 
policy has been almost exclusively theoretical (Baxter, 1992; Bianconi and Turnovsky, 
1997; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). An exception is a recent empirical paper by Arin and 
Koray (2008), who investigate how US fiscal shocks affects the US economy and how   2
they are transmitted to Canada. In the present paper, we focus instead on the effects of 
fiscal shocks on international competitiveness (the bilateral real exchange rate vis-à-vis 
the US dollar) in six Latin American (LA) countries (namely, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and Peru), over the period 1980-2006. Since the seminal contribution of 
Krugman (1979), it is well known among international economists that most of the LA 
countries suffered speculative attacks on their currencies from international investors 
mainly because of inconsistencies between domestic macroeconomic policies and the 
adopted exchange rate regime. In turn, real exchange rate misalignments have often led to 
macroeconomic disequilibria, and hence the correction of external imbalances might 
require both demand management policies and real exchange rate devaluations (see, 
among others, Edwards, 1988). As a result, equilibrium real exchange rates have changed 
over time, periods of large appreciations being followed by severe depreciations or 
periods of stability. Furthermore, real exchange rate variability in the LA countries over 
the eighties was greater than almost anywhere else in the world (Edwards, 1989), owing 
to debt crises that resulted in a real depreciation of the domestic currency, with frequent 
devaluations and inflationary episodes. 
To the best of our knowledge, the effects of fiscal shocks on the real exchange rates 
in the LA countries are yet to be investigated in the literature. Previous analyses of the 
sources of real exchange rate fluctuations have typically focused on the role of real 
demand (Enders and Hurn, 1994), monetary (Clarida and Gali, 1994; Weber, 1997) or 
productivity (Alexius, 2005) shocks, and have overlooked the possible effects of fiscal 
unbalances on countries’ international competitiveness. Notable exceptions are the 
studies of Obstfeld (1993) and Asea and Mendoza (1994), where, in contrast to more 
traditional monetary approaches, the focus is on the role of fiscal policy and other real 
variables (such as productivity shocks) in real exchange rate models. Further, only a few 
studies (Chowdhury, 2004; Hoffmaister and Roldós, 2001) have investigated the sources 
of real exchange rates fluctuations in developing economies, mainly relying on the 
approach proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) to assess the relative contribution of 
temporary and permanent disturbances, while the recent paper by Rodríguez and Romero 
(2007) explicitly analyses the permanent/transitory decomposition of real exchange rates 
in four LA countries.   3
We adopt a framework which allows for a wide range of (structural) shocks 
potentially affecting the real exchange rate. Specifically, we employ a two-country 
macroeconomic model for output, labour input, government spending and relative prices, 
along the lines of the studies by Ahmed et al. (1993) and Hoffmaister and Roldós (2001), 
where the modelling approach to macroeconomic fluctuations developed by Blanchard 
and Quah (1989) is extended to an open-economy setting allowing for the possible 
existence of cointegration relationships among the variables of the system. The 
theoretical model consists of four blocks linked to each other according to a quasi-
recursive scheme, and provides the orthogonality restrictions to be imposed to achieve 
the identification of the structural shocks. These disturbances are identified as supply-side 
(relative productivity and relative labour inputs) and demand-side (relative fiscal and 
relative preference) shocks. Their dynamic effects on the real exchange rate are then 
examined within a structural Vector Error Correction (VEC) framework by means of 
dynamic simulation (such as forecast variance error decomposition and impulse response 
analysis) and historical decomposition techniques.  
Using quarterly data over the period 1980-2006, we provide clear evidence that fiscal 
shocks are a key determinant of real exchange rate dynamics for most of the LA countries 
we consider. However, the sign and the size of the effects of unanticipated fiscal impulses 
on the level of the real exchange rate vary, reflecting different degrees of productivity of 
government expenditure. Further, using alternative econometric specifications, we show 
that the contribution of demand shocks to explaining real exchange rate fluctuations 
increases when shorter cyclical fluctuations are taken into account. Finally, omitting the 
cointegration relationships, which we show exist, is found to lead to overestimating the 
role of demand shocks and underestimating the contribution of fiscal disturbances. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric model. 
Section 3 presents the empirical results. In Section 4, dynamic simulations based on 
forecast error variance and historical decompositions are discussed, while robustness 
analysis is reviewed in Section 5. Some final remarks follow in Section 6.  
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2.  The model 
 
The framework adopted in this Section enables us to study the sources of 
macroeconomic fluctuations in a bipolar world for a group of six LA economies (namely, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru). In line with previous empirical 
papers on these countries, we assume that the US economy is the relevant foreign country 
(Berg et al., 2002; Ahmed, 2003). The chosen model aims to provide a theoretical 
structure to analyse the role of supply and demand shocks (with particular emphasis on 
fiscal disturbances) in explaining the fluctuations of the real exchange rate, one of the 
most common indicators of international competitiveness. This allows us to go beyond 
the dichotomy between permanent/supply and transitory/demand shocks previously 
explored in the literature on real exchange rate determination in the developing countries 
(Chowdhury, 2004; Rodríguez and Romero, 2007).  
 
2.1 Economic relationships 
We analyse the dynamic interactions between the domestic economy and the US 
using a stylised long-run model, which consists of four blocks linked to each other 
according to a quasi-recursive scheme. Following Ahmed et al. (1993) and Hoffmaister 
and Roldós (2001), we rely exclusively on long-run restrictions, which can be directly 
derived from macroeconomic theory (unlike short-run ones, which can therefore be 
controversial). In what follows, the suffix i ( j ) indicates domestic (US) variables, while 
t indexes time. All variables are expressed in logarithms. 
We start by defining a standard production function in the spirit of Binder and 
Pesaran (1999) and Garratt et al. (2003): 
12
y
it i it i it yn =α + +α θ  ,  1
y
jtj j t j j t yn =α + +αθ       (1) 
where  y ’s,  1 α ’s,  n’s indicate total real output, a generic deterministic component (e.g., 
an intercept and a linear trend) and labour inputs, respectively, while the 
y θ ’s represent 
technology shocks driving real output over time. From the equations in (1), relative 
labour productivity can be expressed as: 
ti t i t j t j t t yn yn π≡ − − − = α + φ () ( )         (2)   5
where  ij α= α −α 11 ()  and 
yy
ti i t j j t φ=αθ− αθ 22 ()  represents the relative technology shock. 
In the long run labour inputs are expected to respond to country-specific exogenous 
shocks originating in the labour market and/or from permanent changes in government 
supply policies. Accordingly, we can write down the following functional form for both 
labour input levels:  
12
n
it i i it n =β +β θ  ,  12
n
jtjj j t n =β +β θ  
where the  1 β ’s indicate deterministic components, and the 
n θ ’s represent idiosyncratic 
labour-supply disturbances. Hence, the relative employment level,  t n , can be expressed 
as: 
ti tj t t nnn ≡ − =β+υ          ( 3 )  
where β= β −β 11 () ij  and υ=βθ− βθ 22 ()
nn
ti i t j j t  is the relative labour-supply shock. 
Having defined the stochastic disturbances driving relative labour productivity and 
relative labour inputs, we move on to modelling the public sector of the two economies. 
Let  g %  be government size (defined as the ratio of government purchases of goods and 
services to output); taking the (log of) private output (the difference between total output 
and government spending) in the two economies, 
P y , and using the approximation 
ln(1 ) x − ≅ x we obtain the following relationships: 
P
it it it yy g =− %  , 
P
jtj t j t yy g =− %         (4) 
As in Ahmed et al. (1993), the size of domestic (foreign) government depends both on 
domestic and foreign permanent fiscal policy shocks, the 
P y θ parameters, through a 
feedback reaction function governed by the  2 γ ’s which measure the response to an 
exogenous change in the foreign (domestic) government size:  
12
P P yy
it i it i jt g =γ +θ +γ θ %  ,  12
P P yy
jtj j t j i t g =γ +θ +γ θ %       (5) 
where the  1 γ ’s are constant quantities. Using equations (5) to substitute into (4) we then 
obtain: 
12
P P Py y
it i it it i jt yy =γ + +θ +γ θ  ,  12
P P Py y
jt j jt jt j it yy = γ+ + θ+ γθ 
or, in relative terms:   6
PP
ti t j t i tj t t zy y yy ≡−=−+ ϕ − γ () ( )  
where  ij γ=γ −γ 11  and 
PP yy
ti j tj i t ϕ = −γ θ − −γ θ 22 [(1 ) (1 ) ] represents the relative fiscal shock. 
Using conditions (2) and (3), we can express relative private output as a linear function of 
the structural shocks: 
tt t t z =α+β−γ+φ +υ +ϕ       (6) 
Finally, consumers in both economies are assumed to make their consumption 
decisions to maximise their utility. Adopting a log-linear specification with identical 
preferences in the two countries, the closed-form solution is such that the (log of) relative 
prices,  t q , equals the marginal rate of substitution (Ahmed et al., 1993). In turn, the 
balanced-growth path implies that the ratio of world consumption of each good to total 
private output of that good is constant (d ), ensuring that the following condition holds: 
qq PP
tj t i t i t j t qy y =δ+ θ −θ + − () ()         (7) 
where the 
q θ ’s are time-varying preference shocks entering the agents’ utility 
function. Let 
qq
tj t i t η=θ − θ ()  be the relative preference shock. Combining (6) and (7), we 
can express the real exchange rate as: 
tt t t t q =α+β−γ+δ+φ +υ +ϕ +η       (8) 
Equation (8) expresses real exchange rate dynamics as a combination of the 
underlying disturbances, which are left unrestricted to encompass a large number of 
competing theories of real exchange rate determination. Choosing a theory rather than 
another is thus an empirical issue to be determined by the data. Suppose, for instance, that 
supply-side shocks dominate the dynamics of the  t q  variable. This would support 
empirically the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) view of real exchange rate 
determination.
1 Consider, instead, the case where  t ϕ  turns out to be the most relevant 
source of real exchange rate fluctuations. This would give empirical support to the model 
of Roldós (1995), within which public spending shocks can lead to permanent shifts in 
the real exchange rate. Next suppose that preference shocks are the main driving factor of 
                                                 
1 See Sarno and Taylor (2002) and Alexius (2005) for the empirical content of this paradigm for developing 
and industrialised economies.   7
t q . This would be consistent with a general equilibrium, two-country models with a 
representative utility-maximising agent in the presence of cash-in-advance constraints 
(Stockman, 1980; Lucas, 1982). Clearly, any of the above-mentioned theoretical 
hypotheses could be a plausible explanation for the behaviour of the real exchange rate in 
the LA countries. However, were  t q  to depend only on constant terms, this would put 
into question the empirical validity of the purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis, and 
would be more difficult to rationalise. Recent surveys covering this issue are Sarno and 
Taylor (2002) and Taylor (2006). 
 
2.2 Steady-state of the model 
We assume that the four variables (relative productivity, relative labour input, relative 
private output and real exchange rate) are driven by three common stochastic trends ( t φ , 
t υ  and  t ϕ ) in the long-run. These trends evolve over time according to the following 
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where  0 φ , 0 υ  and  0 ϕ  denote initial conditions and the ε’s are uncorrelated white-noise 
processes such that  () 0
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model also contains the transitory stochastic component  t η , which is assumed to be 
orthogonal with respect to  t
φ ε ,  t
υ ε  and  t
ϕ ε  and obeys the following law of motion: 
1 /(1 ) tt t t L
ηη
− η= ρ η + ε= ε − ρ  ,  1 ρ<  
where  t
η ε  is an uncorrelated white noise process. 
To find the steady state of the model, the initial values of all the permanent shocks 
( 0 φ , 0 υ  and  0 ϕ ) along with the deterministic component of all the variables of the 
theoretical model (α, β, γ, δ) are set equal to zero. Accordingly, the steady state can be 
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         ( 9 )  
The long-run structure (9) implies that not only shocks originating from the supply-
side of the economy but also demand shocks (namely, fiscal shocks) can induce 
permanent shifts of the steady state of the system. By contrast, relative preference shocks 
are assumed to have transient effects on the levels of the variables. This assumption can 
be rationalised in terms of the transitory nature of shocks driving demand for domestic 
and foreign (aggregate) goods.
2 Note that our framework allows for different 
representations without changes in the causality order of the variable and any loss in 
generality, with the restrictive assumption of cointegration not being strictly required to 
achieve identification.
3 On the other hand, testing for cointegration is a relevant empirical 
issue in modelling real exchange rate fluctuations (Alexius, 2005). 
 
2.3. Innovation accounting 
Equations (2)-(3)-(6)-(8) represent the building-blocks to study the interactions 
between domestic and foreign economies. Adopting the same notation as above, we focus 
on the following k -dimensional VAR model in error correction form: 
t tt t i
n p
tt t i t
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tt t i i t
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 ,  t u ∼ u N Σ (0, )     (10) 
where c is a vector of deterministic components, the Γ’s are matrices of autoregressive 
parameters,  ∆ is the first difference operator and the vector  []
nzq
tt t t t uu u u u
π ′ =  
contains the estimated residuals. Given our theoretical assumptions, we expect the long-
                                                 
2 As discussed below, the data are broadly consistent with the empirical specification outlined in this 
Section. 
3 For instance, allowing for permanent shifts in demand between domestic and foreign goods would amount 
to introducing an additional stochastic trend into the system (Ahmed et al., 1993; Hoffmaister and Roldós, 
2001). The model would then exhibit four common trends and no cointegration among the variables.   9
run matrix Π to have rank one, i.e. the presence of one cointegrating vector in model 
(10). 
Structural identification is achieved following the common trends methodology 
(Warne 1993). Omitting the deterministic component, the reduced-form moving average 
(MA) representation of the model defines the data generating process (DGP) as a 
function of the initial conditions (set equal to zero for the sake of exposition) and of the 










where the matrix C  measures the impact of cumulated shocks to the system, CL
*()  is an 
infinite polynomial in the lag operator L, and  [] tt t t t un z q ′ = π . 
The reduced form and the structural residuals are linked through the relationship 
tt uB =ε , where B  is a non-singular matrix (Warne, 1993). Hence, the structural MA 
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where the matrix  CB Φ =  represents the permanent component of the model, and the 
matrix polynomial  L CL B Φ=
** () () the transitory or cyclical component. Structural 
identification allows to decompose each of the four time series into the sum of distinct 
components driven by structural shocks. Focusing on the real exchange rate,  t q , we have 
ttttt qqqqq
φυϕη =+++ with: 
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respectively, where  jk Φ  is the element in the  j -th row and k -th column in Φ, and 
*
, ij k Φ  
that in the  j -th row and k -th column in the matrix 
*
i Φ  which forms the polynomial 
L Φ
*()  in (11). 
The decomposition (12) makes it possible to assess to what extent each of the four 
stochastic elements included in the model contributes to explaining the evolution of the   10
real exchange rate (and the other variables of the system) over time. Once the model has 
been identified, dynamic simulations (such as forecast error variance decomposition and 
impulse analysis) and historical decomposition can be performed.  
 
3.  Data and estimation results 
 
3.1. Data sources and construction of variables 
Quarterly observations over the period 1980q1-2006q4 are used. Data for the nominal 
exchange rate (E ), defined as national currency per US dollar, consumer price index (P ) 
and real GDP (Y ) are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database 
(code AE…ZF, 64…ZF and 99BVP…RZF, respectively). For Argentina and Brazil these 
data were obtained from Datastream. Employment levels (N ), measured in thousand of 
employees, are taken from Datastream for all countries. Finally, the shares of government 
expenditure in good and services (G ) are from Penn World Table 6.2. When quarterly 
observations are not available, annual data have been interpolated to create quarterly 
series using the TSP package. Finally, seasonal adjusting has been carried out using 
TRAMO/SEATS. Private output is obtained by multiplying the level of real GDP for the 
share of private output calculated as (1 G − ). The real exchange rate (Q) is defined as E 
times the ratio between US and domestic prices. Thus, an increase in Q means a real 
depreciation. All the variables are expressed in constant prices (base year 2000=1). Table 
1 below provides further details. 
Table 1 
As a preliminary analysis, we performed standard ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) 
unit root tests on (the log of) each variable. The deterministic component includes an 
intercept and, when statistically significant, a linear trend. The number of lags is chosen 
such that no residual autocorrelation is evident in the auxiliary regressions. In all cases 
we are unable to reject the unit root-null hypothesis at conventional nominal levels of 
significance. On the other hand, differencing the series appears to induce stationarity. The   11
PP (Philips and Perron, 1988) unit root test and the KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992) 




3.2. Baseline specification: VEC model estimates 
The order of autoregression of the models is chosen according to the usual optimal 
lag length criteria (Akaike information criterion, AIC, and Bayesian information 
criterion, BIC), setting the maximum lag equal to eight. In the case of discordant results 
between the alternative criteria, we give preference to the AIC to allow for a richer 
system specification. The order of autoregression turns out to be two for Mexico, three 
for Chile, four for Argentina and Brazil, five for Peru and eight for Bolivia. System 
misspecification tests (not reported to save space) suggest no traces of heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation.
5 Departures from normality are detected in all models. However, as 
pointed out by Lee and Tse (1996), the maximum likelihood approach to cointegration 
developed by Johansen (1995) produces testing procedures which are fairly robust to the 
presence of non-normality. 
The number of cointegration vectors is determined on the basis of the trace test 
statistics of Johansen (1992). Their critical values are taken from Osterwald-Lenum 
(1992). Notice that the VAR specification considered here is model 
*
1() H r  in Johansen’s 
notation, where a linear deterministic trend is implicitly allowed for, but this can be 
eliminated by the cointegrating relations so that the process contains no trend stationary 
components. Table 3 presents the results. The trace test suggests the presence of one 
cointegration relationship in all models at the 5 percent level of significance, except in 
the case of Bolivia where the test suggests choosing a rank of two, but a single long-run 
equilibrium condition at the 1 percent. These results are broadly consistent with our a 
                                                 
4 Results from the PP and KPSS tests are not reported to save space, but are available from the authors 
upon request.  
5 Only in the case of Bolivia are there symptoms of autocorrelation, mainly in the equations for relative 
productivity and relative labour services.   12
priori theoretical assumptions about the existence of (at least) three common stochastic 
trends driving each system.
6 
Table 3 
Structural residuals are then extracted from the reduced-form disturbances by 
imposing (at least) 
2 16 k =  restrictions on the elements of matrix B. A first set of 
constraints is obtained by assuming that the structural shocks are orthonormal: this 
implies ( 1)/2 10 kk +=  (non-linear) restrictions. The choice of the cointegration rank 
allows to distinguish transitory shocks from permanent innovations and produces 
additional ( ) 3 rk r −=  restrictions; in our case, there are four additional zero restrictions 
in the 43 ×  matrix in (9), producing an over-identified structure, which can be tested by 
means of the usual 
2 χ -distributed likelihood ratio (LR) tests. The statistics for Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile and Mexico turn out to be 1.28, 0.68, 0.37 and 1.60 respectively; by 
contrast, in the case of Brazil and Peru, their value is 263.20 and 140.81, respectively. By 
comparing these test statistics to the critical values of a 
2 χ  distribution with one degree 
of freedom, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the over-
identifying restriction only for the first four models. Accordingly, we impose the over-
identified structure in the case of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Mexico, while for the 
Brazilian and Peruvian systems we employ a just-identified structure. 
 
4.  Empirical evidence  
 
Once structural and data-consistent identification of the VEC models is achieved, 
dynamic simulations (forecast error variance decomposition and impulse response 
analysis) as well as historical decomposition exercises can be performed. We employ 
these techniques in order to address three main issues: first, we assess the role played by 
the underlying (structural) sources in explaining the fluctuations of the variables in each 
                                                 
6 The maximum eigenvalue test statistics indicate one cointegrating relationship only for three countries 
(Argentina, Bolivia and Peru), while in the other models (Brazil, Chile and Mexico) there is evidence of 
four common stochastic trends. In general, we favour the conclusions of the trace test in line with Johansen 
(1992), according to which the maximum eigenvalue test may produce a non-coherent testing strategy. 
Results are available on request.   13
country model, also discriminating between supply and demand disturbances (Section 
4.1); second, we study the sign and the magnitude of the response of the real exchange 
rate to an unanticipated fiscal shock (Section 4.2); third, we analyse the contribution of 
each structural shock in driving real exchange dynamics over the sample period under 
investigation (Section 4.3). 
 
4.1 Sources of system-wide and variable fluctuations 
Several studies have analysed the role of demand shocks (for instance, monetary and 
fiscal policies) and supply disturbances (productivity and labour supply shocks or 
structural restructuring policies, such as tariff and trades reforms) in a closed-economy 
context, both at the aggregate (Blanchard and Quah, 1989; Gali, 1999, among others) 
and, more recently, at the disaggregate level (Chang and Hong, 2005; Busato et al., 2005) 
for the US economy or other developed countries. We assess the relative contribution of 
the structural shocks in explaining macroeconomic fluctuations by means of forecast 
error variance decomposition analysis. Such a tool makes it possible to summarise the 
information contained in the structural MA representation (11) and provides a convenient 
measure of the relative importance of each shock to forecast error variance as a function 
of the simulation horizon. Table 4 presents the share of variability (in percentage terms) 
which can be attributed to each structural shock for the individual variables of the model 
as well as for the system as a whole (row labelled as “system”) over a simulation horizon 
of 20 quarters. Aggregating the shocks, we consider supply shocks (φ and υ) and 
demand disturbances (ϕ and η). 
Table 4 
The results are interesting in a number of respects. First, supply shocks are the most 
relevant source of macroeconomic fluctuations in all systems. Their contribution ranges 
from more than 70 percent in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico to around 60 percent in 
Bolivia. This finding is broadly consistent with the empirical evidence for developed 
economies.
7  Second, a closer look at the contribution of structural disturbances to 
                                                 
7 Bergman (1996), for instance, using a bivariate VAR model for output and inflation, shows that more than 
one half of the macroeconomic fluctuations in the G7 countries are due to supply shocks at the typical 
business cycle frequency (the twenty-quarter horizon).   14
fluctuations of individual variables shows the existence of three distinct groups of 
countries. The results for Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico reveal that productivity shocks 
are the main driving forces of relative productivity and relative private output variability, 
while relative labour services and the real exchange rate fluctuations are mainly governed 
by labour input and fiscal shocks, respectively. By contrast, while fiscal shocks still 
represent the main driving forces of the variability of international competitiveness in the 
Chilean economy, relative preference (labour input) disturbances turn out to drive   
variability in the dynamics of relative private output (productivity and labour services). 
Finally, in just-identified structures (Brazil and Mexico), we observe that relative 
productivity and relative labour services fluctuations originate from productivity shocks, 
with labour input and fiscal shocks dominating the variability of private output and real 
exchange rates changes. Third, focusing on the main variable of interest in our analysis 
(the real exchange rate) we find evidence of a difference in behaviour between over-
identified and exactly identified systems: in the former class of models international 
competitiveness is driven by the demand-side of the economy, whilst in the latter group 
of countries the real exchange rate responds mostly to supply-side disturbances. Further, 
fiscal shocks are the main driving force of real exchange rate movements in the majority 
of cases (Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico), ranging from 60 to 90 percent, while they are 
less relevant for Chile and Peru, even though their effects are still sizeable (35 and 21 
percent, respectively). Only in the case of Brazil is the contribution of this shock 
negligible. 
 
4.2. Fiscal shocks and international competitiveness of the LA countries 
The estimated models can be used to assess the effects of mutually orthogonal one-off 
structural shock on the dynamics of individual variables by calculating the impulse 
response functions (IRFs). In particular, we focus on the effects of an unanticipated 
relative fiscal shock on the international competitiveness of the LA countries. Tervala 
(2006) points out that, as government spending may exhibit different degrees of 
productivity, if this is low or zero, a rise in government spending causes a fall in domestic 
consumption, leading to a relative consumption change, which decreases the relative 
demand for domestic money, and consequently the real exchange rate depreciates. These   15
predictions are coherent with the conclusions in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). On the other 
hand, if the productivity of government spending is sufficiently high, domestic 
consumption rises more than foreign consumption. Hence, the nominal and real exchange 
rate appreciate because the relative consumption change increases the relative demand for 
domestic money in a way consistent with the implications of Keynesian-style two-
country models of the world economy.
8 
Figure 1 shows the response of the real exchange rate (solid line) to a positive relative 
fiscal shock for each of the six LA countries. 95 percent confidence bounds (dashed 
lines), generated by Monte Carlo with 5000 replications, are also reported. The 
simulation horizon for IRFs is set equal to 20 quarters. 
Figure 1 
As can be seen, the Argentine real exchange rate appreciates after a relative fiscal 
shock. The loss in international competitiveness is consistent with the conclusions of 
Roldós (1995), according to whom public spending shocks can lead to real exchange rate 
appreciation. Since confidence bounds include the baseline path (the horizontal axis), 
deviations from the pre-shock level cannot be judged to be statistically significant at the 
chosen significance level in the fifth year of the simulation horizon. By contrast, in the 
models of Bolivia, Chile and Mexico we observe that fiscal shocks lead to real 
depreciation, albeit the deviations from the steady-state level for the Bolivian case appear 
to be statistically significant only in the first five quarters. Following the lines of 
reasoning of Tervala (2006), this finding may suggest low productivity of government 
spending policies in these two countries. The response of the Brazilian real exchange rate 
appears not to be statistically significant, consistently with the evidence discussed in the 
previous sub-Section. Finally, in the case of Peru we observe a statistically significant but 
short-lived depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
                                                 
8 The international transmission of fiscal policy shocks in micro-founded general equilibrium models 
crucially depends on assumptions related to whether the fiscal shock is permanent or temporary, whether 
international asset markets are complete or not (Baxter, 1995), whether labor supply is fixed or variable, 
and how government purchases (Bianconi and Turnovsky, 1997) are financed. On this topic, see Arin and 
Koray (2008).   16
In brief, the results from the IRFs suggest a close relationship between relevance of 
fiscal shocks as a driving source for real exchange rate fluctuations and effects of 
unanticipated fiscal shocks on the level of international competitiveness in the LA 
economies. The sign of the response of international competitiveness to this type of shock 
cannot as clearly be determined ex-ante. The evidence reported here indicates a 
substantial inelasticity of international competitiveness to shocks originating from public 
spending policies in countries where fiscal shocks have scant role in explaining real 
exchange variability. On the other hand, fiscal shocks may induce either real exchange 
rate appreciation (for Argentina) or depreciation (for Bolivia, Mexico and Chile) in the 
real exchange rate. 
 
4.3. Explaining real exchange dynamics in LA countries over the years 1980-2006 
This sub-Section describes how to assess the observed real exchange rates patterns for 
our six LA countries in the light of historical shifts in their fundamentals. Indeed, the 
existence of a stable long-run relationship among the variables of each model does not 
prevent the relative weight of those factors from changing over time in response to 
complex and interrelated reciprocal influences. Hence, it could be instructive to examine 
the hypothetical time path of international competitiveness if all disturbances had been 
associated to only one source of shock. 
Table 5 summarises the relevance of each structural component in explaining 
international competitiveness variability over time. OLS estimates are obtained by 
regressing changes in the real exchange rate on its component driven by individual 
orthogonal shocks according to the decomposition (12). Since structural components are 
mutually orthogonal by construction, the total variation of the regressand (changes in 
international competitiveness) must be fully captured by the explanatory variables (supply 
shocks, φ and υ, and demand disturbances, ϕ and η). 
Table 5 
The results indicate that the in-sample variability of the real exchange rate is 
dominated by demand shocks in most of the models, with percentages ranging from 39 
percent in the case of Chile to 92 percent in that of Bolivia. In particular, for five out of 
the six countries (Brazil being the only exception), fiscal shocks account for a   17
considerable percentage of real exchange rate movements, ranging from one-fifth (for 
Peru) to four-fifth (for Mexico) of total variability. Also, notice that in most cases 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Peru) the effects of fiscal impulses are stronger than 
those of productivity shocks. Finally, the relative importance of the temporary 
components (namely, preference shocks) varies across countries, being at its highest in 
Brazil, where it explains 43 percent of the historical variance (the effects of fiscal shocks 
being negligible), and in Peru, where the corresponding share is 34 percent, whilst is 
countries such as Mexico and Chile it is as low as 6.13 and 6.47 respectively. 
In order to check for possible shifts in the relative explanatory contribution of shocks 
for real exchange rate changes over the sample span, we use a rolling method, i.e. we 
employ the estimated models to replicate the previous exercise over the window 
embracing the period from the first available observation to 1994q4 and then extending it 
by a datapoint at a time. Summary statistics (mean, standard error of the mean, minimum 
and maximum values) for each system are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6 
The results broadly confirm the previous evidence in a number of ways. First, fiscal 
shocks are the most relevant source of variation for real exchange rates in the over-
identified models. Second, in all models, the mean values of each shock resulting from 
the rolling procedure are quantitatively very close to their full-sample counterparts and 
qualitatively similar to the results from the forecast error variance decomposition 
exercise. Third, the standard error of the mean, as well as the minimum-maximum range, 
suggest that the relative contribution of the four driving forces in explaining real 
exchange rate changes are almost constant over time. 
The last piece of evidence concerns the relationship between structural shocks and the 
pattern over time of the level of international competitiveness. Figure 1 shows, for each 
country, the real exchange rate series purged of the deterministic part (solid line), and its 
component explained by the fiscal shocks (dashed line).  
Figure 2 
Visual inspection suggests the following. It seems that the effects of fiscal shocks in 
the period 1981-1986 are considerable for all the countries under examination. After this 
period, however, this is still the case only in the models of Bolivia and Mexico, while in   18
Chile and Peru long swings in the real exchange rate are only partially caused by the 
fiscal components. Consistently with the previous results, fiscal shocks do not appear to 
have significant explanatory power for real exchange rate movements in Brazil. 
Combining this evidence with the results of the IRF analysis, we can conclude that in 
the cases where the real exchange rate depreciates in response to a relative fiscal shock 
(namely, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Peru), the explanatory power of these structural 
shocks is more pronounced over the entire investigation period. In the case of Argentina, 
where the IRF analysis shows the opposite result (that is, a real appreciation in response 
to a relative fiscal shock), the time path of the real exchange rate is less influenced by the 
component caused by this shock. According to Tervala (2006), the different time paths 
followed by the component of real exchange rates driven by fiscal shocks can be 




5.  Robustness 
 
The results from structural VAR models relying on long-run restrictions may vary 
considerably depending on the exact specification of the empirical model. As argued by 
Faust and Leeper (1997), identification procedures, which involve restrictions on the 
long-run effects of structural shocks, may imply that type-II errors are more likely in 
confidence intervals because of the imprecision of the long-run parameter estimates. 
Therefore, in this section we study the robustness of the results discussed above with 
respect to changes in the empirical specification of the systems. 
Three alternative empirical specifications are estimated in order to investigate how 
the relative weights of demand shocks (and in particular fiscal shocks) vary with the 
nature of the fluctuations. We filter the data by different methods, namely first 
differences,  FD, the HP filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997), HP, and linear detrending, 
                                                 
9 As shown by Rodriguez and Romero (2007), in Argentina the hyperinflation phenomenon which took 
place at the beginning of the 1990 and the following abolition of the currency board explain the dominant 
effect of the variability of transitory components on the behaviour of the real exchange rate, while in the 
case of Brazil (where the initially floating exchange rate was subsequently fixed) international 
competitiveness has mainly been driven by real shocks in the last decade.   19
LD. In particular, FD series are used to isolate short cycle fluctuations, HP-filtered 
series for intermediate frequencies and LD series for low frequencies. We expect the role 
of demand shocks to decrease with the persistence of shocks.
10 Notice that all alternative 
specifications neglect the existence of possible cointegration relationships. Thus, our 
robustness checks can shed light on the consequences of ignoring the presence of long-
run equilibrium relationships between the variables. 
Table 7 presents the results from imposing the over-identifying long-run restriction in 
the three alternative empirical specifications.  p -values are in square brackets.  
Table 7 
Overall, the long-run structure implied by our theoretical relationship of reference is 
not rejected by the data in nine (one at the 1 percent, one at the 5 percent and the 
remaining seven at the 10 percent level of significance) out of eighteen cases. In 
particular, the outcome from the FD specification is fully consistent with the baseline 
design, even though the test statistics are slightly less supportive of our economic priors. 
In the present context, this conclusion is not surprising since the FD specification 
produces loss of relevant information, in the presence of documented cointegration 
relationships. Notice, further, that in the LD specification we observe the rejection of the 
null hypothesis in all models but one (the Chilean case). 
Following the same criterion as in the previous Section, we perform a forecast error 
variance decomposition under the over-identified structure for the specifications where 
the over-identifying restriction holds, but employing the just-identified structure when the 
constraint imposed on the long-run matrix is rejected by the data. The simulation horizon 
is set equal to 20 quarters. Table 8 shows the contribution (in percentage terms) of 
aggregate demand shocks and fiscal shocks to the overall forecast error variance of the 
real exchange rate under the three alternative empirical specifications.  
Table 8 
As expected, in most cases the relative importance of demand shocks is stronger in 
the specification where the short-run cycle frequency, FD, is isolated, and decreases 
                                                 
10 The  FD  specification is the baseline model (10) with  0 Π =  and with four common trends. Such a 
specification is consistent with the conclusions of the maximum eigenvalue test for Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico.    20
when a longer cyclical component is taken into account, that is when we move from the 
HP to the LD specification. 
Comparing these results to those from the VEC models, we observe that the 
explanatory power of demand shocks under the alternative specifications is greater than 
their counterparts from the baseline specification with cointegration. Moreover, focusing 
on the individual demand shocks, there is evidence of a bigger role for relative preference 
shocks, these now becoming the most important source for real exchange rate 
fluctuations.  
As shown by Alexius (2005), the lack of the long run-equilibrium conditions between 
fundamental variables and the real exchange rate eliminates the relationship between the 
latter and productivity disturbances. Thus, the relative system impact of supply 
disturbances tends to decrease. In addition, if the long-run properties of the system are 
not properly taken into account, the effects of fiscal shocks are underestimated, as the 
relationship between government size and the dynamics of the real exchange rate is 
overlooked. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper adopts a modelling approach aimed at assessing the role of a wide class of 
underlying (structural) disturbances in driving real exchange rates (defined relative to the 
US dollar) in six LA countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru), 
along the lines of the studies of Ahmed et al. (1993) and Hoffmaister and Roldós (2001). 
These disturbances are identified as relative productivity, labour, fiscal and preference 
shocks.  
Using quarterly data over the period 1980-2006, we analyse the case of the LA 
economies, for which the effects of fiscal shocks on the real exchange rate had not 
previously been studied. Specifically, we show that fiscal shocks are a key determinant of 
changes in international competitiveness for most of the countries we consider. Our 
approach sheds new light on the driving forces of real exchange rate dynamics in 
developing economies. A simpler modelling strategy, relying exclusively on a standard 
permanent/transitory decomposition, would provide only partial evidence, as, by   21
construction, it would allow for only two types of shocks, ignoring the possibility of a 
wider class of disturbances hitting the economy as a whole (and consequently the real 
exchange rate as well) that also need to be investigated. 
Therefore, our contribution to the literature on fiscal shocks is two-fold. First, we 
identify fiscal shocks in a multicountry/multivariate time series context, allowing for the 
existence of possible cointegration relationship among the variables of the system. 
Second, we present some new empirical evidence for six Latin American countries. We 
find that the effects of unanticipated fiscal impulses on the level of the real exchange rate 
vary, reflecting different degrees of government expenditures productivity. Further, using 
alternative econometric specifications, we show how the importance of fiscal shocks (and 
more in general of demand shocks) on the variability of the international competitiveness 
varies with the frequency of cyclical fluctuations isolated in the models. The explanatory 
power of demand shocks increases when shorter cyclical fluctuations are taken into 
account. Moreover, neglecting the presence of cointegration, which in fact holds in our 
case, amounts to overlooking the linkage between productivity and government spending 
and the real exchange rate. As we show, this leads to overestimating the role of demand 
shocks and underestimating the contribution of fiscal disturbances, putting into question 
the reliability of earlier evidence for which this criticism is relevant (see, e.g. Ahmed et 
al., 1993; Chowdhury, 2004; Hoffmaister and Roldós, 2001; Rodríguez and Romero, 
2007). 
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Table 1 – Construction of the variables 
 
Note. For each variable the suffix i refers to each Latin America country in turn, while the suffix US refers 
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Table 2 - Unit root tests 
  π  n z q 
 Levels  First 
differrences  Levels  First 
differrences  Levels  First 
differrences  Levels  First 
differrences 
  DP TS DP TS DP TS DP TS DP TS DP TS DP TS DP TS 
Argentina  c,t -2.16 c -9.92 c,t -2.42 c -4.35 c -1.94 . -4.13 c,t -3.79 c -3.44 
Bolivia  c,t -2.08 c -6.45 c,t -2.01 c -4.74 c,t -0.32 c -1.87 c -1.46 . -4.96 
Brazil  c -1.66 . -6.44  c,t  -2.18 c -5.19 c -1.73 . -3.70 c -1.24 . -4.63 
Chile  c,t -2.05 c -7.94 c,t -1.76 c -6.59 c,t -2.86 c -3.63 c,t -1.16 c -4.45 
Mexico  c,t  -1.76 c -5.73  c,t  -2.06 c -4.22 c -1.42 . -3.95 c -2.33 . -11.7 
Peru  c,t  -1.52 c -6.64  c,t  -0.03 c -5.43 c -1.49 . -2.70 c -1.95 . -4.74 
 
Note. ADF test statistics for the null hypothesis of a unit root process for the variables in the levels and in 
first differences are reported in columns “TS”. The critical value at the 1 percent level of significance is -
4.05 if a constant and a linear trend (c,t) are included in the regression, -3.49 with only a constant term (c) 
and -2.59 if no deterministic parts (-) are included. At the 5 percent level of significance these values are -
3.45, -2.89 and -1.94, respectively (MacKinnon, 1996). The specification of the deterministic component is 
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Table 3 - Cointegration rank 
  Rank 
  
Lags 
0 1 2 3 
Argentina 4  66.77 28.53 11.03 1.87 
Bolivia 8  69.77  31.16  11.77  0.42 
Brazil 4 47.31  22.6 8.3 0.47 
Chile 3 48.89  26.05  11.11  2.66 
Mexico 2  49.48  27.07  11.47  0.63 
Peru 5  56.06  28.68  4.64  0.74 
 
Note. Critical values for the trace test statistics at the 95 percent for rank 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 are 47.21, 29.68, 
15.41 and 3.76, respectively, while at the 99 percent are 54.46, 35.65, 20.04 and 6.65, respectively 
(Osterwald-Lenum, 1992). The column “Lag” reports the number of lags included in the VAR specification 
suggested by the AIC. 
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Table 4 - Forecast error variance decomposition 
   Individual shocks  Nature of shocks 
  Argentina 
  φ  υ  ϕ  η  Supply Demand 
∆π  82.80 1.68 11.87 3.65  84.48 15.52 
∆n  0.96 97.46 0.37  1.21  98.42 1.58 
∆z  87.24 11.96  0.69  0.11 99.20 0.80 
∆q  16.13 8.99 60.69  14.19  25.12 74.88 
System  46.78 30.02 18.41  4.79 76.81 23.19 
  Bolivia 
  φ  υ  ϕ  η  Supply Demand 
∆π  50.58 5.43 34.82 9.17  56.01 43.99 
∆n  7.61 91.93 0.12  0.34  99.54 0.46 
∆z  70.68 6.14 19.16 4.02  76.82 23.18 
∆q  3.32  0.71 90.77 5.20 4.03 95.97 
System  33.05 26.05 36.22  4.68 59.10 40.90 
  Brazil 
  φ  υ  ϕ  η  Supply Demand 
∆π  90.77 4.67  0.73  3.83  95.44 4.56 
∆n  67.84 26.20  2.92  3.04 94.04 5.96 
∆z  6.90 17.83  69.03 6.24  24.73 75.27 
∆q  22.73 61.64  0.48  15.15  84.37 15.63 
System  47.06 27.59 18.29  7.07 74.65 25.36 
  Chile 
  φ  υ  ϕ  η  Supply Demand 
∆π  20.06 47.70  6.02  26.22  67.76 32.24 
∆n  11.56 82.91  0.28  5.25 94.47 5.53 
∆z  43.83 6.77  1.69 47.71  50.60 49.40 
∆q  23.76 27.85 34.82 13.57  51.61 48.39 
System  24.80 41.31 10.70 23.19  66.11 33.89 
  Mexico 
  φ  υ  ϕ  η  Supply Demand 
∆π  86.20 0.65  0.97 12.18  86.85 13.15 
∆n  2.49 95.96 0.07  1.48  98.45 1.55 
∆z  70.92 25.75  2.52  0.81 96.67 3.33 
∆q  17.52 1.63 78.35 2.50  19.15 80.85 
System  44.28 31.00 20.48  4.24 75.28 24.72 
  Peru 
  φ  υ  ϕ  η  Supply Demand 
∆π  67.42 22.32  2.86  7.40 89.74 10.26 
∆n  67.32 25.31  3.78  3.59 92.63 7.37 
∆z  7.35 13.03  64.80  14.82  20.38 79.62 
∆q  23.35 39.07 21.05 16.53  62.42 37.58 
System  41.36 24.93 23.12 10.59  66.29 33.71 
 
Note. Average percentage contribution of each structural shock in explaining variable fluctuations over a 
simulation horizon of 20 quarters. φ, υ,  ϕ, η indicate relative productivity, relative labour, relative fiscal 
and relative preference shocks, respectively. The column “Supply” is the aggregate contribution of φ and υ  
disturbances. The column “Demand” is the aggregate contribution of ϕ and η disturbances. The row 
“System” indicates the average contribution of individual shocks and aggregate disturbances, disentangled 
according to their nature, for the whole system.   30
Table 5 - Historical decomposition 
  Individual shocks  Nature of shocks 
   φ  υ  ϕ  η  Supply Demand 
Argentina  19.07 24.65 35.35 20.93  43.72 56.28 
Bolivia 5.21  2.90  73.36 18.53 8.11 91.89 
Brazil 15.51 39.87  1.25  43.37  55.38 44.62 
Chile 39.11 21.89 32.53  6.47 61.00 39.00 
Mexico  10.98 2.04 80.85 6.13  13.02 86.98 
Peru  17.82 27.11 21.02 34.05  44.93 55.07 
 
Note. Percentage contribution of each structural shock in explaining the historical variance of the real 
exchange rate quarterly changes. φ, υ,  ϕ, η indicate relative productivity, relative labour, relative fiscal and 
relative preference shocks, respectively. The column “Supply” is the aggregate contribution of φ and υ  




   31
Table 6 - Historical decomposition – Rolling Method 
  Argentina 
  φ  υ  ϕ  η 
Mean  19.07 22.24 38.93 19.76 
Std. err. of mean  0.05 0.22 0.33 0.14 
Minimum  18.23 19.65 34.92 17.80 
Maximum  20.08 25.16 42.27 21.71 
  Bolivia 
  φ  υ  ϕ  η 
Mean  2.59 2.53  79.07  15.81 
Std. err. of mean  0.11 0.03 0.36 0.24 
Minimum  1.98 2.08  73.36  12.33 
Maximum  5.21 2.93  83.57  18.88 
  Brazil 
  φ  υ  ϕ  η 
Mean  17.65 38.03  1.09  43.22 
Std. err. of mean  0.16 0.17 0.01 0.17 
Minimum  15.44 35.14  0.84  40.22 
Maximum  20.18 41.18  1.25  46.73 
  Chile 
  φ  υ  ϕ  η 
Mean  39.98 22.03 31.05  6.94 
Std. err. of mean  0.14 0.10 0.13 0.06 
Minimum  38.04 20.77 28.73  6.10 
Maximum  42.51 23.70 32.87  7.65 
  Mexico 
  φ  υ  ϕ  η 
Mean  10.32 1.87 82.70 5.11 
Std. err. of mean  0.03 0.02 0.12 0.08 
Minimum  9.87 1.66  80.85  3.93 
Maximum  10.98 2.17 84.53 6.13 
  Peru 
  φ  υ  ϕ  η 
Mean  22.29 30.68 14.37 32.66 
Std. err. of mean  0.29 0.31 0.45 0.17 
Minimum  17.82 26.24 11.20 30.49 
Maximum  24.31 33.18 21.31 35.56 
 
Note. Percentage contribution of each structural shock in explaining the historical variance of the real 
exchange rate quarterly changes. φ, υ,  ϕ, η indicate relative productivity, relative labour, relative fiscal and 
relative preference shocks, respectively. Summary statistics computed over simulation windows of 
increasing size, extended by a datapoint at a time, are reported by rows. All windows start with the first 
available observation, but they have different ending quarters. The smallest window covers the period up to 
1994q4, while the largest window embraces the entire sample span.    32
Table 7 – Robustness Analysis - Model specification 
  Model specification 
   FD HP LD 
Argentina [0.01]  [0.24]  [0.00] 
Bolivia [0.30]  [0.00]  [0.00] 
Brazil [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Chile [0.09] [0.54] [0.45] 
Mexico [0.10]  [0.41]  [0.00] 
Peru [0.00]  [0.65]  [0.00] 
 
Note. p-values from a χ
2-distributed LR over-identifying test with one degree of freedom are reported in 
squared brackets. FD, HP and LD indicates first differences, HP (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) and linear 
detrending filters, respectively. 
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Table 8 – Robustness Analysis - Forecast error variance decompositions  
  Model specification 
  FD HP LD 
   Demand 
shocks  ϕ  Demand 
shocks  ϕ  Demand 
shocks  ϕ 
Argentina  79.31  2.20  83.02  6.62  43.17  14.22 
Bolivia  94.48  21.24  82.46  12.26  89.05  7.64 
Brazil  85.26  30.37  42.64  14.89  60.52  25.66 
Chile  79.85  5.13  82.16  30.23  45.01  3.05 
Mexico  91.51  7.61  63.33  4.18  17.29  2.06 
Peru  89.23  5.52  45.60  0.40  27.78  2.06 
 
Note. Average percentage contribution of demand and relative fiscal shocks (φ) in explaining real exchange 
rate fluctuations at different cyclical frequencies over a simulation horizon of 20 quarters. FD, HP and LD 
indicates first differences, HP (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) and linear detrending filters, respectively.    34
Figure 1 – Response of the real exchange rate to a fiscal shock 
 
Note. Response of the real exchange rate to a relative fiscal shock. The vertical axis denotes changes from 
the pre-shock level (solid lines). The horizontal axis indicates quarters after the shocks. Confidence bounds 
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Figure 2 - Real exchange rate dynamics and the component driven by the fiscal shock  
 
Note. In each graph, the dashed line indicates the real exchange rate, while the solid line plots its 
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